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Shareholder Liability For Postdissolution
Claims In California: Pacific Scene, Inc.
v. Penasquitos, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION
The "trust fund" doctrine" traditionally has been applied to allow
satisfaction of predissolution claims out of the distribution of corpo-
rate assets to shareholders.2 Many courts and commentators have
suggested that such an equitable remedy should likewise be applied
to those claims arising after the dissolution' of a corporation.'
1. The "trust fund" doctrine is defined as:
[W]here [a] corporation transfers all its assets with a view to going out of
business and nothing is left with which to pay debts, [the] transferee is charged
with notice of the circumstances of the transaction, and takes the assets subject
to an equitable lien for the unpaid debts of the transferring company.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1356 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability
Claims, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 865, 909 (1971). This viewpoint was also discussed in
Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 407, 758 P.2d 1182, 250 Cal. Rptr.
651 (1988).
3. "The dissolution of a corporation is the termination of its existence as a body
politic." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (5th ed. 1979). In California, a corporation may
be dissolved involuntarily by: 1.) a limited number of people by the filing of a verified
complaint in a county superior court, provided certain criteria are met (CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1800 (West 1977)); or 2.) attorney general on certain grounds (CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1801 (West 1977)). The grounds for involuntary dissolution are drastic since the
legislative intent was to restrict involuntary dissolution to limited instances. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1800, Leg. Comm. Comment (1975) - Assembly (West Supp. 1988). Once the
corporation has been involuntarily dissolved by "order, decree or judgment of a court, a
copy of the order, decree or judgment, certified by the clerk of court, shall forthwith be
filed in the office of the Secretary of State." CAL. CORP. CODE § 1809 (West 1977).
A corporation may also close its doors voluntarily. A majority of shareholders may
vote to dissolve the corporation. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
Once a corporation has completed the process of closing down, a certificate of dissolution,
signed and verified by a majority of directors, is filed with the Secretary of State. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 1905 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). All shareholders and known creditors
are notified of the voluntary dissolution pursuant to CAL CORP. CODE § 1903 (West
1977).
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2000-11 cover the dissolution process, other than the procedural
requirements of filing a certificate of dissolution. This Note will deal with topics covered
generally by § 2009 and § 2011. See infra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. Section
2010 also is relevant, although not mentioned in the California Supreme Court's decision
in Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 403, 758 P.2d 1182, 250 Cal. Rptr.
However, a recent California Supreme Court case, Pacific Scene,
Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc.,5 concluded that the California Legislature
had precluded the availability of that equitable remedy when it
amended the California Corporations Code in 1975.
This Note will review the equitable remedy traditionally allowed
under the "trust fund" theory and the statutory corporate scheme
now in place in California. In addition, California case law, before
the 1975 amendment to the Corporations Code and after, will be
reviewed. This Note will then discuss the policy reasons behind the
California Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Scene disallowing the
equitable remedy of holding shareholders liable on predissolution
claims. Ultimately, this Note will conclude that, in light of the deci-
sion in Pacific Scene, there is a need for the legislature to address
the issue. The legislature should allow a limited period of time, after
dissolution, in which creditors can recover from the dissolved corpo-
ration on claims which have arisen after the dissolution of the
corporation.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRUST FUND THEORY
A. The Common-Law Trust Fund Theory
The "trust fund" theory began as a common-law doctrine which
was applied in courts of equity. Before its adoption, a creditor whose
claim arose before the corporation was dissolved had no recourse if
the corporation had dissolved before the claim was satisfied.6
The trust fund theory, articulated in Wood v. Dummerl and again
in Mumma v. The Potomac Co.,8 was based on constitutional con-
tract clause principles.9 The idea behind this doctrine is that share-
651 (1988). Section 2010 allows a corporation to continue for certain limited purposes
during the winding-up period: litigation; conveyance of property and other assets; and
any other action which is included in winding up the affairs of the corporation. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2010 (West 1977). See also C. FRIEDMAN, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE
CORPORATIONS § 8(1)590-94 (student ed. 1988).
4. Henn & Alexander, supra note 2, at 909 n.5.
5. 46 Cal. 3d 407, 758 P.2d 1182, 250 Cal. Rptr. 651 (1988).
6. A bona fide creditor might find that there was no recovery possible. Courts of
equity applied the "trust fund" theory to get around this potentially harsh result by hold-
ing shareholders liable to those creditors for any amounts received on dissolution. Wal-
lach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant - The Effect of a Sale of
Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Products Dissatisfaction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV.
321, 328 (1976). Dissolution of a corporation traditionally put an end to all claims
against the corporation. Id. at 329.
7. 30 F. Cas. 435 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No. 17,944) (Story, C.J.).
8. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 281 (1834).
9. The rationale was that state laws governing the dissolution of a corporation
could not impair the obligation of the contract between the corporation and the creditor;
that obligation would survive the dissolution of the corporation. Mr. Justice Story, deliv-
ering tile court's opinion in Mumma, analogized a dead corporation's contractual obliga-
tions to those of a dead person's. "The obligation of those contracts survives; and the
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holders are acting as trustees over a fund to which creditors have a
superior claim. The shareholders are liable for any claims which a
creditor might have against the dissolved corporation to the extent
they received corporate assets. This is true whether or not the share-
holders knew of the claims when they received the distribution.'-
B. The Trust Fund Theory and California Case Law
California courts have recognized the viability of the "trust fund"
theory for more than eighty years. The first California case which
recognized the validity of this equitable theory was Crossman v.
Vivienda Water Co." The California Supreme Court stated "[t]he
universally accepted modern doctrine is that the debts of the corpo-
ration are not vacated by its dissolution. In the absence of statute,
equity treats the surviving assets as a trust fund for the creditors and
stockholders, and enables beneficiaries to reach the same by appro-
priate procedure. 
'12
In Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co.,' 3 the California Su-
preme Court looked at whether a contract could be enforced by the
assignee after the dissolution of the contracting corporation. The
court did not specifically base its holding on the "trust fund" theory,
but reiterated in dicta the importance of the "trust fund" theory in
California law.'
4
More recent cases have also allowed recovery under the equitable
"trust fund" theory. In 1970, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
held, in Zinn v. Bright,15 that a creditor's sole means of recovering
from a dissolved corporation was under this theory. However, at the
time Zinn was decided, there was a slightly different version of the
corporations code in place.' 6 That version gave a creditor no legal
creditors may enforce their claims against any property belonging to the corporation,
which has not passed into the hands of bona fide purchasers. . . ." Id. at 285.
10. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK FOR THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busi-
NESS ENTERPRISES § 171 (2d ed. 1970) for a discussion of the development of the "trust
fund" theory.
11. 150 Cal. 575, 89 P. 335 (1907).
12. Id. at 579, 89 P. at 336.
13. 30 Cal. 2d 335, 182 P.2d 182 (1947).
14. "Since the assets of a dissolved corporation can only be distributed to the
shareholders subject to the rights of creditors of the corporation, the assets of the corpo-
ration remained subject to an equitable charge for all debts owed by the corporation
." Id. at 345, 182 P.2d at 188-89.
15. 9 Cal. App. 3d 188, 87 CA. Rptr. 736 (1970).
16. 1947 Cal. Stat. 2396 (current version at CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009 (West
1977)). See infra notes 22-23.
right of action and imposed no duty on the corporation to bring an
action against its shareholders. 7 Therefore, the court held there was
no statutory limit on a creditor's equitable right to pursue recovery18
under the "trust fund" theory.'9 The corporation was the only party
which could bring an action against a shareholder under the old sec-
tion 5012; creditors had no statutory remedy.2 °
C. The Current Statutory Scheme
In 1975, the California Corporations Code was amended to pro-
vide specific procedures for making claims against dissolved corpora-
tions.21 This was a distinct change from the previous section 5012,
which allowed only the corporation, or its representative in bank-
ruptcy, to sue shareholders for assets improperly distributed. Credi-
tors had no statutory right to directly sue shareholders to recover
assets the shareholders might have received improperly. In addition,
the corporation had no duty to bring an action against the sharehold-
ers to satisfy any outstanding creditor liability.22 Thus, under the old
section 5012, creditors could potentially be left without a statutory
remedy to recover on any claims after dissolution of the corporation.
The amended statutory scheme added a statutory right of credi-
tors to sue the shareholders for any improper distribution of corpo-
rate assets. That right can be found in California Corporation Code
section 2009 which replaces the former section 5012.23
17. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009 (West 1977). See infra note 23.
18. Zinn, 9 Cal. App. 3d at 192, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
19. Id. The court based its holding on the rule that if there is no statute which
specifically excludes the equitable remedy, the court will allow that equitable remedy to
be pursued. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Oil Resources, Inc., 817 F.2d 1429
(9th Cir. 1987), applied the converse of this rule to deny recovery under the "trust fund"
theory. The Oil Resources court felt that the legislature had enacted an appropriate
statutory remedy in CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying
text.
20. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009 (West 1977). See infra note 23.
21. See 1975 Cal. Stat. 1609. The changes were effective January 1977.
22. 1947 Cal. Stat. 2396. Section 5012 provided in relevant part:
Whenever in the process of winding up a corporation any distribution of assets
has been made . . . without prior payment or adequate provision for payment
of any of the debts and liabilities of the corporation, any amount so improperly
distributed to any shareholder or owner of shares may be recovered by the
corporation or by its receiver, liquidator, or trustee in bankruptcy. Any of such
shareholders or owners may be joined as defendants in the same action or
brought in on the motion of any other defendant.
Id.
23. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009 (West 1977). Section 2009 provides in relevant part:
(a) Whenever in the process of winding up a corporation any distribution of
assets has been made . . . without prior payment or adequate provision for
payment of any of the debts and liabilities of the corporation, any amount so
improperly distributed to any shareholder may be recovered by the corporation
... (b) Suit may be brought in the name of the corporation to enforce the
liability under subdivision (a) against any or all shareholders receiving the dis-
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In addition, Section 2011 sets up the procedural go ahead for
creditors to sue in the name of the corporation, after the corporation
has been dissolved.
2 4
Subsequent courts had a difficult time determining if sections
2009 and 2011 were meant to negate the equitable "trust fund" rem-
edy historically available in California.
D. Case law Since the 1975 California Corporations Code
Revision
In 1977, the California Supreme Court heard the case of Ray v.
Alad Corp.25 The main thrust of the case was the overlap between
the remedies provided under the California Corporations Code and
the remedies promulgated by the California Supreme Court in the
field of products liability recovery.2 6 The general rule was that a suc-
cessor corporation was not responsible for a predecessor's liabilities,
however, this court made an exception to that rule based on the poli-
cies behind strict products liability in California. While this case
dealt with the liability which would be attributed to a successor cor-
poration, it can be analogized to the liability of shareholders after
the dissolution of the corporation.2 a In both situations, courts have
tribution by any one or more creditors of the corporation, whether or not they
have reduced their claims to judgment.
Id.
24. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011 (West 1977). Section 2011 provides in relevant part:
"(a) In all cases where a corporation has been dissolved, the shareholders may be sued in
the corporate name of such corporation upon any cause of action against the corporation
arising prior to its dissolution. This section is procedural in nature and is not intended to
determine liability." Id.
25. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
26. The plaintiff brought a strict liability tort action for injuries which he sus-
tained in a fall from a defective ladder six months after the defendant corporation had
acquired the assets of the manufacturing corporation. Id. at 25-28, 560 P.2d at 5-7, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 576-78.
27. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582. The court found that the
successor corporation was producing essentially the same product (the ladder), was rely-
ing on the predecessor corporation's goodwill in selling the product, and was not differen-
tiating itself in the public's mind from the predecessor corporation. All of these factors
led the court to hold the successor corporation liable for a defective product manufac-
tured by the predecessor corporation. The court found that the successor corporation was
enjoying substantial benefits from the acquisition of the precedessor corporation and
should therefore shoulder the accompanying burdens. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 10-11, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
28. Shareholders are also benefitting from the predecessor corporation's goodwill
and ability to produce a beneficial product when they cash out their equity position in the
corporation. Traditionally, however, shareholders have been held liable for a corpora-
tion's liabilities under the equitable "trust fund" theory, while successor corporations
given plaintiffs an equitable way to recover for their injuries even
though the corporation has been dissolved.
In Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co.,29 the
United States District Court of the Northern District of California,
applying California law, barred equitable recovery from the share-
holders of a dissolved corporation on a predissolution claim. The
court stated that there were no other reported California cases at the
time which had decided the question of shareholder liability. All of
the previous cases had been decided under the older California cor-
porate statutory scheme.30
In reaching its decision, the court analogized to the results
reached in two federal district court cases: one decided under Iowa
law31 and the other decided under Massachusetts law. 32 However,
this analogy was flawed for a basic reason. The two corporation
codes relied on in these cases were significantly different from the
California corporation provisions, despite the contrary statement by
the Levin Metals court. Both Iowa and Massachusetts put time limi-
tations on causes of action filed after the dissolution of the corpora-
tion.33 California does not have a statute of limitations on recovery
of predissolution claims against a dissolved corporation.
In 1987 United States v. Oil Resources, Inc.3 4 came before the
Ninth Circuit. This case involved a claim of shareholder liability for
the taxes of a dissolved corporation. The IRS had sued the successor
corporation, the predecessor corporation, Oil Resources, and Oil Re-
sources' shareholders. The IRS sought to recover back taxes owed by
Oil Resources.3" The district court held that the shareholders of Oil
often have not been held liable.
29. 631 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
30. Id. at 304. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
31. Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F.Supp. 94 (N.D. Iowa 1968). See infra
note 33 for an analysis of the Iowa statute.
32. Gonzalez v. Progressive Tool & Die Co., 455 F. Supp. 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
See infra note 33 for an analysis of the Massachusetts statute.
33. The Bishop court limited the time for recovery on predissolution claims to the
two year statute of limitations set out in the IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.102 (West 1962
& Supp. 1988). The Gonzalez court declined to allow recovery under the "trust fund"
theory because Massachusetts law provided for the existence of a dissolved corporation
for three years after dissolution "for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
. . . ." MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156B, § 102 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988). The legisla-
ture had placed a statute of limitations on recovery but in the process impliedly allowed
recovery for postdissolution claims. See also infra note 80 and accompanying text.
34. 817 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1987).
35. The predecessor corporation was Oil Resources, Inc. It had "transferred all of
its assets and liabilities to Capital Energy Corporation [the successor corporation] in
exchange for Capital stock." Id. at 1430. The Capital stock was distributed to all Oil
Resources shareholders and Oil Resources was dissolved. Capital had assumed Oil Re-
sources' unpaid tax liabilities as part of the exchange. Id. at 1430-31. The federal circuit
court held there was a de facto merger of the two corporations. Id. at 1434, 1484 n.6.
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Resources were liable under the "trust fund" theory.36
The court of appeals reversed, closing off the possibility of recover-
ing from Oil Resources' shareholders. However, this court left open
the possibility that shareholders would be held liable if adequate pro-
vision for predissolution liabilities had not been made. 7 The court
based its decision on the presence of section 2009 which specifically
deals with predissolution claims.3 8 The court did not discuss post-
dissolution claims.
III. EXPOSITION OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
Pacific Scene, Inc. (Pacific) is a California corporation which
mass produces tract homes. Penasquitos, Inc. (Penasquitos) was a
California corporation which developed, finished, and sold residential
lots which were used for tract homes. In 1974, Penasquitos sold a
number of graded lots to Pacific. Pacific built homes on those lots
and a year later sold those homes to the public. In 1979, Penasquitos
was dissolved.3 9 In 1982, nine homes sustained damage resulting
from soil subsidence of lots which Penasquitos sold to Pacific. The
homeowners sued Pacific on theories of strict products liability, neg-
ligence, and breach of warranty.40
Pacific cross-claimed against Penasquitos, which demurred.41 The
trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dis-
missed the cross-complaint.42 The trial court concluded that Califor-
36. Id. at 1432, 1434. The only time the equitable remedy would not be available
would be when the common-law remedy under the "trust fund" theory specifically con-
flicted with the statutory remedies. Id. at 1432-33. Yet, the court effectively foreclosed
the availability of the "trust fund" theory to creditors looking for relief in a de facto
merger situation. Id. at 1434.
37. The analysis revolved around the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA),
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3439-3439.12 (West Supp. 1989). See infra notes 81-89 and accom-
panying text. The court held that there had been adequate provision for the debts of the
predecessor corporation and sufficient consideration had been paid when Capital ex-
changed stock for the assets of Oil Resources. Oil Resources, 817 F.2d at 1432-33.
38. See supra note 23. "Common law rules must yield when they conflict with a
statute's logic and intention .... Insofar as the theories may conflict, permitting relief
under the Trubowitch 'trust fund' theory would undermine legislative intent." Oil Re-
sources, 817 F.2d at 1432-33. (citations omitted).
39. It is unclear from the facts whether the dissolution was voluntary or involun-
tary. See supra note 3 for a detailed discussion of dissolution procedures in California.
40. Pacific Scene, Inc. Penasquitos, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 407, 409, 758 P.2d 1182,
1182, 250 Cal. Rptr. 651, 652 (1988).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 409, 758 P.2d at 1182-83, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 652. There would be no
nia Corporations Code section 2011 barred a suit against a dissolved
corporation on claims arising after the dissolution. 43 The court of ap-
peal agreed that the corporation itself could not be sued. However, it
reversed with directions to grant Pacific leave to cross-complain
against the former shareholders of Penasquitos under the equitable
"trust fund" theory.44 The California Supreme Court granted the
shareholders' petition for review45 and reversed the court of appeal,
concluding that Pacific's postdissolution claim against the sharehold-
ers of Penasquitos under the "trust fund" theory was barred.46
B. The Court of Appeal's Opinion
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One, looked at the
history of the California Corporation Codes dealing with dissolution,
yet came up with a result opposed to the California Supreme Court's
final decision. 7 The court of appeal concluded that the equitable
means of recovery was still available to creditors. The court found
that plaintiffs would suffer an unjust hardship if there were no equi-
table "trust fund" recovery. The dissolved corporation was no longer
in existence and the shareholders who had received distributions
from the dissolved corporation would be free from any claims arising
out of postdissolution injuries, absent fraud or consideration
question of Penasquitos' liability if it had been a "living" corporation. California courts
had recognized the liability of both builder-sellers of mass-produced homes and develop-
ers of residential lots under the strict products liability rule outlined in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). See
infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the products liability con-
cerns raised in Pacific Scene. The two cases which established the liability of developers
and builders were Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969) and Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
43. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 195 Cal. App. 3d 533, 536, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 758, 759 (1987). The claims brought before the court "arose" when the homeown-
ers discovered the damage to their homes due to the soil subsidence, three years after
Penasquitos had dissolved. "In all cases, the statute of limitations begins to run from the
time the cause of action accrues. The general rule is that the cause of action accrues on
the date of injury in a negligence action." 2 M. MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 18.1
(2d ed. 1988).
California has an additional statute of limitations on causes of action relating to dam-
age due to development or improvement of real property. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
337.15(a) (West 1982). That statute of limitations limits recovery to 10 years after "the
substantial completion of the development or improvement" for any damage due to a
latent deficiency. Id. The statute defines a latent deficiency as a "deficiency which is not
apparent by reasonable inspection." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.15(b) (West 1982).
This statute of limitations was not an issue in Pacific Scene, although there are many
instances where itV might be of overwhelming importance.
44. Pacific Scene, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 545, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
45. Pacific Scene, Inc. v. Penasquitos, Inc., 747 P.2d 527, 243 Cal. Rptr. 86
(1988) (en banc).
46. Pacific Scene, 46 Cal. 3d at 410, 758 P.2d at 1183, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
47. Pacific Scene, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 545, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 766.
[VOL. 26: 157, 1989] Pacific Scene v. Penasquitos
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
problems. 8
The court of appeal was practical in reaching its decision to allow
retention of the "trust fund" theory of recovery. It mentioned that,
without that theory of recovery, a corporation might purposely plan
to limit its lifespan to cut off shareholder's liability, especially in
those industries where there is a greater risk of products liability.4
The court of appeal also emphasized the history of products liabil-
ity in California. The court argued that history and the policies be-
hind the products liability theory must be considered in coming to a
reasoned decision in this case. Those policy reasons include Califor-
nia's traditional place at the forefront of protection of injured con-
sumers, and the idea that the cost of the injury should be borne by
the manufacturer of the defective product.50
C. The California Supreme Court's Opinion
The California Supreme Court's opinion51 focused on the share-
holders' arguments that the California legislature had prescribed the
rights and r:emedies relating to corporate dissolution in such detail
that the equitable "trust fund" remedy was no longer available. 2
While there is no legislative history available for section 2011, 51 the
48. Id. at 543-44, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 765. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the relationship of fraudulent transfers to dissolution of
corporations.
49. Id.
50. Id. The traditional policy reasons behind applying strict liability in tort, articu-
lated by leading commentators in the field, are:
(I) The costs of damaging events due to defectively dangerous products can be
borne by the enterprisers who make and sell these products .... (2) The
cause of accident prevention can be promoted by the adoption of strict liability
and the elimination of the necessity for proving negligence .... (3) . . . for
institutional reasons and because of the costs of litigation, proof of the exis-
tence of fault of negligence in the sale of a defective products should no longer
be required ....
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 692-93 (5th ed. 1984).
51. The opinion was written by J. Mosk, with six other justices concurring. There
was no dissenting opinion.
52. Pacific Scene, 46 Cal. 3d at 409-10, 758 P.2d at 1183, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
The court focused on § 2009 and § 2011(a) of the California Corporations Code. See
supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
53. The court of appeal specifically mentioned its attempt to track down the legis-
lative history of § 2011. "We unsuccessfully attempted to obtain legislative history
materials from both the Legislature and the State Bar. We were able to locate more than
200 pages of materials concerning the bill [the amendment to the Corporations Code]
through the State Archives, but section 2011 is never mentioned." Pacific Scene, 195
Cal. App. 3d at 538, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 761.
California Supreme Court discussed in detail a legislative intent to
create finality and certainty in corporate dissolution. 4 It was that
interpretation of the legislative intent that led the court to conclude
that the equitable remedy which Pacific sought would frustrate the
general purpose of the Corporations Code. 5
In addition, the court looked at the history of the two Corporate
Code sections 56 and how they had been amended over the years. Be-
cause amendments had substantially altered the statutes after the
earlier cases had been decided, the court distinguished those cases
from the case before it. 7 The court argued that the equitable rem-
edy was barred by the statutory scheme, foreclosing the possibility of
Pacific recovering from Penasquitos, or its shareholders, in a cross-
complaint.5
IV. ANALYSIS
The California Supreme Court and the lower court of appeal em-
phasized four areas of analysis: the applicability of sections 2009 and
2011 to postdissolution claims; the need for finality for both the cor-
poration and its shareholders; products liability and latent defect
59
concerns; and the applicability of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act (UFTA)60 to the dissolution of a corporation and distribution of
its assets to shareholders. While the final result of not holding the
54. Pacific Scene, 46 Cal. 3d at 417, 758 P.2d at 1188, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 657-58.
Arguably, the California legislature was not overly concerned with the need for finality.
Many states have statutorily provided certainty to corporations with regard to predissolu-
tion claims by only allowing actions against a dissolved corporation, its officers, directors
or shareholders within two years of the dissolution. See infra note 79 and accompanying
text. California, however, has declined to place a time limitation on predissolution claims.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009 (West 1977).
55. Arguably, the need for finality is more important to the corporation itself. It
has a need to wind up its afairs; dissolution has essentially rendered it dead. See supra
note 3.
56. Sections 2009 and 2011. Section 2009 was previously known as § 5012. See
supra note 22. Section 2011 was previously known as §§ 3305, 3305.1, 3305.2, and 3306.
CAL. CORP. CODE xxi-xxii (West 1977).
57. The court specifically looked at the previous § 5012 and the Zinn case, stating
that two commentators had concluded that § 2009 effectively overruled Zinn and its
reliance on the equitable "trust fund" theory. Pacific Scene, 46 Cal. 3d at 412, 758 P.2d
at 1185, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 654. The commentary by Ballantine and Sterling opined that
the "trust fund" recoveries were barred after the passage of § 2009. The source for this
statement was the Oil Resources decision. IA BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA
CORPORATION LAWS § 317.04 (4th ed. 1988). See also supra notes 34-38 and accompa-
nying text.
58. See infra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
59. "Latent defect" is defined as a defect "which could not be discovered by rea-
sonable and customary inspection." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (5th ed. 1979).
60. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3439-3439.12 (West Supp. 1988). "Fraudulent conveyance
law is a set of remedial principles designed to protect creditors from debtors who transfer
their assets in a form detrimental to creditors' claims." Fraudulent Conveyances, 5
Debtor-Creditor Law (MB) 22.01[A] (Dec. 1988). This is generally applied in bank-
ruptcy and insolvency cases.
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shareholders liable eight years after the lots were graded and three
years after the dissolution of the corporation has its merits, the anal-
ysis which the California Supreme Court used was flawed.
A. Applicability of Sections 2009 and 2011 to Postdissolution
Claims
Pacific Scene involves a conflict between section 2009, a rather
specific all-encompassing statute covering debts and liabilities of the
corporation when it dissolves,"' and section 2011, a procedural stat-
ute regarding predissolution claims.6 2 The problem arises in deter-
mining if section 2009 applies solely to predissolution claims, thus
leaving open equitable recovery under the "trust fund" theory. The
California Supreme Court found that the California legislature had
set out "detailed statutory remedies now encompassing virtually all
claims previously asserted in equity against former shareholders of
dissolved corporations. ' 63 However, there is no direct evidence that
the legislature intended section 2009 to apply to postdissolution
claims.6 4
Under section 2009, a predissolution creditor of a dissolved corpo-
ration may bring a suit, in the name of the corporation, to recover
assets distributed to shareholders without adequate provision for that
creditor's claim.6 5 It doesn't matter whether the creditor's claim has
been reduced to judgment; the predissolution creditor retains the
right to bring both a predissolution and a postdissolution suit.66
In Oil Resources,6 7 the Ninth Circuit interpreted this section in a
manner consistent with the California Supreme Court's decision in
Pacific Scene. Their interpretations bar equitable recovery for claims
arising after dissolution, even though the language of section 2009
taken with section 2011 speaks only to predissolution claims. Thus,
despite the lack of legislative history clearly requiring such an inter-
61. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009 (West 1977). See supra note 23 for the text of this
code section.
62. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011 (West 1977). See supra note 24 for the text of this
code section.
63. Pacific Scene, 46 Cal. 3d at 413, 758 P.2d at 1185, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
64. If the legislature had intended that result, they simply had to add language to
the text of the statute, limiting the equitable remedy. By leaving it out, arguably, they
were allowing for the equitable "trust fund" remedy which had an 80-year history in the
state of California. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
65. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2009(a), (b) (West 1977).
66. CAL CORP. CODE § 2009(b) (West 1977).
67. 817 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
pretation, 8 the California Supreme Court was willing to find that
section 2009 precludes equitable recovery. Arguably, section 2009
fails to distinguish between pre and postdissolution claims due to the
legislature's recognition of California's long history of allowing re-
covery under the "trust fund" theory. 9
Section 2011 is solely a procedural statute.7 0 It allows sharehold-
ers to be sued on any cause of action "arising prior to [the corpora-
tion's] dissolution. x7 1 Shareholders of Penasquitos argued that since
there was no provision within section 2011 for postdissolution claims,
the legislature had declined to give postdissolution claimants any
means of recovery. 2 The California Supreme Court declined to base
its denial of equitable recovery to postdissolution claimants on this
"negative implication. 73
However, the court rejected the court of appeal's finding that since
section 2011 only spoke of predissolution claims, postdissolution
claims were "relegat[ed] . ..to . . .equity. '7 4 The court applied a
legislative history analysis of the underlying rationales for the disso-
lution sections of the corporations code.7 5 That purpose was to pro-
vide finality and certainty to the dissolution process. 6 In doing so,
the court precluded equitable recovery. Arguably, section 2011 is
subject to the same analysis applied to section 2009 above.
B. Need for Finality
There is legitimate need for finality when winding up the affairs of
a corporation. The corporation and its shareholders share that need,
although they have different motivations. The corporation has a need
for certainty in its winding up process so that it can close its books,
provide for its debts and liabilities, and distribute the remaining as-
sets to the shareholders.7
Likewise, the shareholders have a need for certainty. When they
receive their share of the corporate assets, they should not be re-
68. See supra note 53.
69. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text for a brief overview of decisions
which have allowed shareholder liability under the "trust fund" theory.
70. See C. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 8 at 1597.
71. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2011(a). Section 2011, however, "does not authorize suits
against a dissolved corporation's shareholders for causes of action arising after dissolu-
tion." C. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, § 8 at 1600 (emphasis original).
72. Pacific Scene, 46 Cal. 3d at 414, 758 P.2d at 1186, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
73. Id.
74. Id., at 415, 758 P.2d at 1186, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 656.
75. The court merely cited to §§ 2009-11 for its finding of legislative purpose. Id.,
758 P.2d at 1186, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
76. Id.
77. The need has its basis in the idea that a dissolved corporation is a dead corpo-
ration. See supra note 9. The need can best be understood by analogy to the need for
winding up the estate of a dead person in a timely fashion.
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quired to hold the money in "trust" on the remote possibility of a
postdissolution claim. They will want to spend or reinvest that
money, not keep it tied up.78
These needs for finality on the parts of the shareholders and the
corporation are in direct conflict with the interests of the creditors of
the corporation, both known and unknown. A creditor has a right to
recover any debt owed to him or her by the dissolved corporation. If
the debt arises prior to dissolution of the corporation, as it would in a
normal general business creditor case, the creditor has a statutory
cause of action. 79 However, if it is a claim arising after dissolution of
the corporation, it is barred by the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Pacific Scene.
Is there a resolution to this conflict between the corporation's and
its shareholders' needs for finality and the legitimate interest of cred-
itors in recovering their claims? The ideal resolution does not lie in
the decision of the Pacific Scene court to bar postdissolution claims
completely.
If the courts are concerned about the unlimited liability which
would attach to the shareholder's distribution under the "trust fund"
theory, another possible solution would be to allow postdissolution
claims for a limited period of time after the dissolution of the corpo-
ration, such as three years.80 That would allow creditor's claims
which might arise after dissolution of the corporation to be pursued.
It would also address both the corporation's and its shareholders' fi-
78. Contrast the ability of a shareholder to continue using the assets after distribu-
tion with the limited ability of a corporation to continue its existence after it has been
declared legally dead in the course of dissolution. See CAL CORP. CODE § 2010(a) (West
1977) (which provides for a corporation to continue to exist only for "the purpose of
winding up its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions by or against it and enabling it
to collect and divide its assets .... "). See also supra note 3.
79. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2009, 2011 (West 1977). See also supra notes 23-24.
80. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 105 (1979) (allowing predissolution
claims to be prosecuted if commenced within two years after dissolution); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 102 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988) (allowing the corporation to be
continued for three years after dissolution for purpose of prosecuting and defending suits,
in addition to other winding-up processes); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.102 (West 1962 &
Supp. 1988) (allowing predissolution claims to be prosecuted if commenced within two
years of dissolution). These statutes allow predissolution claims to be prosecuted for only
a limited period of time. In the Comment to the Model Business Corporation Act section
105, the existence of "a body of equity law allowing suits to be brought against directors
and shareholders on the principle of tracing the funds of the corporation after dissolu-
tion" is clearly recognized. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT. ANN. § 105 1 2 (2d ed. 1971). So, if
the courts refuse to recognize the "trust fund" theory which is recognized in the Model
Business Corporation Act itself, they might extend the statute of limitations applied to
predissolution claims to postdissolution claims.
nality concerns by providing a cutoff on liability. Such a solution,
however, is for the California legislature, not the court system, given
the decision in Pacific Scene.
C. Applicability of Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA)
Another potential solution to creditors' concerns was provided by
Justice Mosk, in his opinion for the California Supreme Court. He
made a passing remark at the end of Pacific Scene designed to allay
fears that consumers and creditors would be left with no remedy:,"
"Thus if a corporation were to mass produce defective products and
then dissolve to avoid liability . . . grave questions would be raised
under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act." 2
The UFTA allows a creditor to recover assets transferred by the
debtor if: (a) the debtor actually intended to defraud the creditor;
(b) the debtor did not receive sufficient consideration in exchange for
the transfer, provided the debtor "reasonably should have believed"8 3
he or she would incur more debt than they had assets to pay.84
The applicability of this statute to intentionally fraudulent trans-
fers is self-evident. However, its application to postdissolution claims
is more problematic. To begin with, the language is unclear whether
both requirements, (a) and (b), must be satisfied to have a valid
claim under section 3439.04. Between (a) and (b) in the statute
there is no connector; there is no "and" or "or." '85
Aside from that ambiguity, proof of actual intent to defraud will
revolve around a court's consideration of the so-called "badges of
81. In all likelihood, J. Mosk derived this idea from the Ninth Circuit's discussion
of UFTA concerns in Oil Resources, 817 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1987). But, Oil Resources
applied the UFTA to the transfer of assets between corporations in a de facto merger
situation. In Oil Resources, the court looked to whether the transfer of assets was made
with the intention to defraud or was without adequate consideration, Id. at 1432. The
court found there was no fraudulent transfer of assets and that Oil Resources and its
shareholders could not be held liable on that ground. Id.
82. Pacific Scene, 46 Cal. 3d at 418, 758 P.2d at 1189, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 658
(emphasis added). The court specifically relied on CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.04. Section
3439.04, entitled "Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors," provides in
part:
A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a credi-
tor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or
the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the
obligation as follows: (a) With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any
creditor of the debtor. (b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in
exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor: . . . (2) Intended to
incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or she would in-
cur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they become due.
CAL CIV. CODE § 3439.04 (West Supp. 1989).
83. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3439.04(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
84. Id.
85. See infra note 82.
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fraud"8' in light of all the relevant circumstances.8 7 The creditor
would have the burden of proving the debtor's fraudulent intent in
transferring corporate assets to shareholders on dissolution.
If the creditor carried her burden of proof, she would be entitled
to "avoidance of the transfer" or "an attachment or other provisional
remedy against the asset transferred." 88 However, this remedy is
limited by the provision that a transfer will not be voided against a
good-faith transferee who paid sufficient consideration.'
Thus, in a situation where the corporation simply decided to vol-
untarily dissolve, with no motive of fraud, a subsequent creditor
would be unlikely to be successful in pressing a claim for recovery
under the UFTA. To be successful, the creditor would have to show
that the corporation had been dissolved without adequate provision
for all known claims or with an intent to defraud the subsequent
creditors. Looking at Pacific Scene, it is easy to see the difficulty in
applying the UFTA to a case involving a voluntarily and nonfraudu-
lently dissolved corporation.
D. Products Liability Concerns
In addition, Pacific Scene involves an important twist: a products
liability claim. Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court did not
address this products liability aspect in their opinion.90
A strict liability claim can be made against a whole line of enti-
ties, from the producer of the raw materials to the final retailer.91 In
the late 1960s, California recognized a strict liability cause of action
as applied to both builders of mass-produced homes92 and developers
86. "Recognized 'badges of fraud' include fictitious consideration, false statements
as to consideration, transactions different from usual course of doing business, transfer of
all of a debtor's property, insolvency, confidential relationship of parties, and transfers in
anticipation of suit or execution." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 127 (5th ed. 1979).
87. The legislature listed a nonexhaustive set of factors which might be relevant.
CAL. CIV.CODE § 3439.04 legislative comm. comment 115-7 (West Supp. 1989).
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.07 (West Supp. 1989).
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3439.08(a) (West Supp. 1989).
90. The importance of the products liability aspect was addressed in more detail in
the court of appeal's decision. Pacific Scene, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 543-45, 240 Cal. Rptr.
at 765-66.
91. That line of liability is: producer of the raw material; the maker of the compo-
nent part; assembler; packager; wholesaler or distributor; one who holds the products out
as his or her own; and the retailer. A. WEINSTEIN, A. TWERSKI, H. PIEHLER & W. DONA-
HER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT: A GUIDE FOR MAN-
AGEMENT, DESIGN, AND MARKETING 96-97 (1978).
92. Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
See also supra note 42.
of residential lots.93 However, in those cases, the corporations were
still in existence when the plaintiffs discovered the latent defects and
filed their suits.
Once again, a tension exists between the need for providing for a
creditor's claim9" and the need for finality in corporate dissolution
proceedings. However, the considerations for assessing strict liability
claims are slightly skewed by the California courts' leading role in
allowing plaintiff recoveries in products liability suits. In these cases,
plaintiffs are entitled to recovery since the posts are most efficiently
borne by the defendants;9" the entity which puts the product on the
market should be required to figure the possibility of latent defects
into its costs and price its product accordingly. This approach pre-
vents a windfall to shareholders of a corporation that dissolves after
taking into account the added costs of strict liability.9
One only has to look to the history of California decisions to real-
ize that California courts have been a leader in broadening plaintiff
rights in products liability cases.9 7 Yet, in Pacific Scene the Califor-
nia Supreme Court turned away from that tradition by relying only
on statutory construction of the corporations code to reach its deci-
sion. The court denies a number of plaintiffs any recourse, and opens
up a way for corporations wishing to protect themselves or their
shareholders from liability to insulate themselves in contravention to
the acclaimed California products liability doctrine.98
V. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's decision in Pacific Scene, based
on its statutory interpretations, leaves creditors with valid postdis-
solution claims without any effective remedy. While it is true that
the statute can be interpreted in a multitude of ways, it is only by
looking at the statute in the environment of products liability that
93. Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
See also supra note 42. In Avner, the court "conclude[d] that the manufacturer of a lot
may be held strictly liable in tort for damages suffered by the owner as a proximate
result of any defects in the manufacturing process." Id. at 615, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
94. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
96. The price of the product will have been raised without a corresponding burden
of responding to products liability lawsuits.
97. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963).
98. The court of appeal recognized this problem in its decision, foreseeing that "it
may become economically prudent for certain corporations to purposefully plan on only
limited life spans." Pacific Scene, 195 Cal. App. 3d at 544, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 765. The
court of appeal felt that this would be especially true in just those industries where the
product liability rationale should be applied most strictly, industries such as construction
or drug manufacturing. Id.
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the court could have properly balanced all the factors involved in
Pacific Scene. The court of appeal had previously produced a deci-
sion where all the ramifications were discussed in detail, deciding in
favor of shareholder liability under the "trust fund" theory.
The fact that the court of appeal's decision balanced all the fac-
tors does not alter its potential for abuse. Shareholders have a need
for finality similar to that of the corporation. They should not be
held liable ad infinitum for the postdissolution liabilities of their dis-
solved corporation.
There is a potential for abuse of a different nature in the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision. While the court's decision limits the
liability of a corporation's shareholder, it does not allow for the pos-
sibility of recovery for a postdissolution claimant. By not discussing
the products liability aspects, and by making a single remark about
the availability of a UFTA remedy, the California Supreme Court
decision in Pacific Scene is not as well balanced as it could have
been.
Arguably, this is not an area where the court should intrude. The
California Supreme Court pointedly referred to its unwillingness to
engage in judicial lawmaking.99 ' But the history of equitable reme-
dies allows the court to intrude where equity and justice require in-
trusion. In Pacific Scene, the homeowners will not be denied relief
since Pacific Scene will bear the entire burden of Penasquitos' defec-
tive soil compacting. However, it is easy to imagine another case
where houses are built by a corporation which also performed the
soil compacting. The houses are then sold to home buyers, at which
time the corporation is promptly dissolved. Or even more burden-
some to a potential plaintiff, one may imagine a drug manufacturer
closing down after a limited lifespan to protect itself from possible
products liability claims. Should a homeowner later encounter de-
fects in the home or the user of the drug later develop a serious
complication, absent evidence of a fraudulent conveyance, there is no
remedy left open under the California Supreme Court's decision in
Pacific Scene.
Given the California Supreme Court's interpretation of sections
2009 and 2011, the legislature now must address the situation. The
ideal remedy is for the legislature to allow postdissolution claims for
99. The court specifically denounced judicial lawmaking with regard to providing
an equitable remedy for post-dissolution claims. "[T]he matter seems to involve too
many imponderables to be susceptible of any satisfactory judicial solution." Pacific
Scene, 46 Cal. 3d at 413 n.2, 758 P.2d at 1185 n.2, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 655 n.2.
a limited time period following a corporation's dissolution. By doing
so, the needs of the corporation and its shareholders for finality
would be balanced against the need for recovery by a creditor (be it
a plaintiff injured in a strict liabilty claim or another creditor whose
claim did not arise until after dissolution).
The statute of limitations should accommodate different latency
periods of injuries by specifying different limitations for various
types of conduct. For instance, injuries caused by defective medica-
tion are often recognized after a much longer time period than inju-
ries from a defective power tool. Thus, a shorter statute of limita-
tions is appropriate for the tool-caused injury than the drug-related
injury.
In the meantime, there will surely be a number of plaintiffs with
valid claims left without a remedy due to the California Supreme
Court's decision in Pacific Scene.
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